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Abstract
This paper examines whether biblical descriptions of the intermediate state imply 
dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism. Certain passages in the Bible seem 
to describe persons or souls existing without their bodies in an intermediate state 
between death and resurrection. For this reason, these passages appear to imply a 
form of dualism. Some Christian physicalists have countered that the passages in 
question are in fact compatible with physicalism. For it is compatible with physi-
calism that, although we are necessarily constituted by physical bodies, we can 
continue to exist without our current bodies in the intermediate state by being con-
stituted by replacement bodies. I argue that broadly Gricean considerations signifi-
cantly weaken this response. In its place, I propose a new, linguistic objection to the 
biblical argument for dualism. The linguistic objection says that biblical descriptions 
of an intermediate state cannot imply dualism in the sense that contradicts physical-
ism because physicalism is defined by a concept of the physical derived from mod-
ern physics, and no term in the biblical languages expresses that concept. I argue 
that the linguistic objection is less vulnerable to Gricean considerations than the 
constitution objection. On the other hand the linguistic objection also makes con-
cessions to dualism that some Christian physicalists will find unacceptable. And it 
may be possible to reinforce the biblical argument for dualism by appeal to recent 
research on ‘common-sense dualism’. The upshot for Christian physicalists who 
wish to remain open to the biblical case for an intermediate state is therefore partly 
good, partly bad. The prospects for a Biblical argument for dualism in the sense that 
contradicts physicalism are limited but remain open.
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Introduction
A number of biblical passages appear to describe human persons or souls exist-
ing without their bodies in an intermediate state between death and resurrection. 
It has been argued on this basis that the Bible implies a form of soul-body dual-
ism. Some Christian physicalists have replied that the intermediate state, if there 
is one, is compatible with physicalism. For it is compatible with physicalism that 
human persons are only contingently constituted by their current bodies, and that 
they, or their ‘souls’, continue to exist in the intermediate state by being con-
stituted by a replacement body. This paper takes the discussion forward in two 
ways. First, I introduce a distinct, linguistic objection to the biblical argument 
for dualism, construed as an argument against Christian physicalism: physicalism 
is standardly defined by a concept of the physical derived from modern physics; 
the biblical languages have no term that expresses this concept; for this reason, it 
seems that the linguistic resources of the Bible prevent it from affirming dualism 
in the sense that contradicts physicalism. Secondly, I describe a strategy for rein-
forcing the biblical argument for dualism by appealing to conversational implica-
ture. I argue that this strategy significantly weakens the constitution objection but 
that it is not comparably effective against the linguistic objection. For Christian 
physicalists who wish to remain open to the biblical case for an intermediate state 
the upshot is partly good and partly bad. On the one hand, if the relevant passages 
imply an intermediate state at all, then it appears that the intermediate state must 
be a nonbodily state in the sense of ‘body’ found in these passages. On the other 
hand, it does not follow that the intermediate state is nonphysical in the sense that 
defines physicalism. So, although the Bible might imply dualism of some sort, it 
is much less clear that it implies dualism in the sense that contradicts physical-
ism. In the final section, I suggest that the biblical argument for dualism might be 
further reinforced by appeal to research on the ‘naturalness’ of thinking of human 
persons in a dualist way. However I give reasons for thinking that this strategy 
will have limited dialectical force pending further research. The aim of this paper 
is not to throw additional weight to one or other side of the debate about Chris-
tian physicalism, but to open two new lines of argument that should be of interest 
to all parties.
Christian physicalism
It is generally recognised that most historical Christian thinkers from the church 
fathers down have advocated some form of soul-body dualism (cf. Rickabaugh, 
2018b). An early exception is Hobbes (Leviathan 1.4.21; 1.12.7; 3.34.1–26; 
3.38.4; 4.44.15–16). Hobbes rejects the view that the soul is an incorporeal sub-
stance on the basis that ‘substance’ and ‘body’ are synonyms, and that ‘incorpo-
real substance’ is therefore a contradiction. Hobbes also urges that, for several 
reasons, dualism does not fit well with Christianity. First, the term ‘soul’, in the 
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Bible, does not refer to an immaterial substance, but to life or to a living creature. 
Secondly, the Bible teaches the resurrection of the body, not the immortality of 
the soul. Thirdly, belief in an immaterial soul among Christians can be traced 
to the influence of pre-Christian Greek culture. Hobbes’s contemporaries were 
largely unswayed. But twentieth-century theologians gave new life to the Hobbe-
sian outlook. Important contributions to this development include Wheeler Rob-
inson’s (1911) argument that dualism misrepresents the Old Testament view of 
human persons, and Oscar Cullmann’s (1958) argument that the New Testament 
teaches the resurrection of the body only, not the immortality of the soul. By the 
late twentieth century, opposition to dualism was commonplace among Christian 
theologians.
While the theological considerations that Hobbes advanced in favour of Chris-
tian materialism resemble those that gained favour among twentieth century theo-
logians, Hobbes’s philosophical case for materialism has enjoyed no such afterlife. 
However, in the twentieth century philosophers developed a new line of argument 
in favour of a position that resembles Hobbes’s materialism insofar as it is a form of 
monism which leaves no room for nonphysical souls. This is the position known as 
‘physicalism’. David Papineau (2007) sets out an influential account of the rise of 
physicalism. On Papineau’s account, with the progress of physical science it became 
clear that physical events in the brain are brought about by prior physical causes 
in a way that leaves no room for nonphysical souls (or minds, etc.) to exert a sys-
tematic causal influence on the brain. It is generally assumed that if nonphysical 
souls exist at all then they exert a systematic causal influence on the brain. And so 
it was concluded that nonphysical souls do not exist and that there is nothing more 
to humans than our physical bodies. This is known as the ‘causal exclusion argu-
ment’ for physicalism. In conjunction with various auxiliary arguments, the casual 
exclusion argument led to the establishment of physicalism as the standard position 
in philosophical anthropology. Whether or not Papineau’s story is historically or sci-
entifically accurate, the causal exclusion argument remains the leading argument for 
physicalism in the recent philosophical literature.
The philosophical and theological developments of the twentieth century summa-
rised here suggest, for independent reasons, that there is nothing more to human per-
sons than our physical bodies. It is therefore natural that Christian philosophers have 
brought the two together to establish a tradition of Christian physicalism. Christian 
physicalism can be seen as combining the latest developments in theology and phi-
losophy to yield a scientifically and theologically respectable account of human 
nature. I discuss a position advanced by two Christian physicalists, Lynne Rudder 
Baker and Kevin Corcoran, at some length in what follows. Other representatives of 
Christian physicalism include Peter van Inwagen (1995), Trenton Merricks (1999, 
2001, 2009) and Nancy Murphy (2006).
Physicalism is often called ‘materialism’. This is because physicalism resembles 
the traditional materialism of Democritus, Epicurus and Hobbes, if nothing else, in 
that it is a monistic ontology that rules out nonphysical souls. But there is an impor-
tant difference between present-day physicalism and traditional materialism, and 
hence between the Christian physicalism that has become popular of late and the 
Christian materialism of Hobbes. The classic materialists limited their ontologies to 
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entities that satisfy the pretheoretical concept of bodies as things that take up space. 
Democritus, Epicurus and Hobbes sought to understand reality in terms of the 
motions of solid, extended objects of various shapes and sizes. Physicalists, by con-
trast, limit their ontology to the kind of things described by physics. (Jessica Wilson 
(2006, fn. 1) lists some examples.) This revision in our understanding of ‘material-
ism’ developed gradually over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
in response to the increasing tendency of physicists to describe reality in terms of 
entities such as overlapping fields, volumeless particles and wave-particle dualities, 
that do not fit comfortably within traditional or pretheoretical conceptions of matter. 
(At least one defence of what I am calling ‘Christian physicalism’, Corcoran (2018), 
argues in favour of the label ‘materialism’ rather than ‘physicalism’. But Corcoran 
uses the term ‘materialism’ to indicate that he endorses a nonreductive view about 
higher-level properties, not because he is committed to an old-fashioned conception 
of matter. On the contrary, Corcoran (2018, p. 374) defines ‘materialism’ in terms of 
the concept of ‘physical’ things where this refers to ‘the sorts of entities it is the job 
of physicists to investigate’.) For this reason, despite its resemblance to traditional 
materialism, physicalism is a distinctively modern position that could not have been 
formulated prior to the development of modern physics. In many contexts, the differ-
ence between modern, scientifically inspired physicalism and traditional materialism 
can be ignored, and it is usually left in the background in discussions of Christian 
physicalism. But as I explain in what follows, this difference makes room for a novel 
linguistic objection to the biblical argument for dualism, insofar as that argument is 
supposed to pose a threat to Christian physicalism.
The biblical argument for dualism
Christian physicalism has obvious merits. But Christian physicalists must contend 
with the biblical argument for dualism. This argument is advanced in its most com-
prehensive form by John Cooper (2000, 2001, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2015, 2018). A 
similar line of argument was advanced earlier by Joseph Ratzinger (1988, 104–29). 
Several other scholars have added their support (e.g. Moreland, 2014, 40–73; Gun-
dry, 2005; Esler, 2005; Steiner, 2015; Rickabaugh, 2018a, 2019). (It might be urged 
that there are really several distinct biblical arguments for dualism. If so, it is Coop-
er’s argument on which this paper focuses.) Cooper’s presentation of the argument 
is complex. But its main pillar is the claim that a number of biblical passages entail 
that human persons, or their souls, continue to exist in an intermediate state between 
death and resurrection. It is the continued existence of persons or souls in the inter-
mediate state that Cooper regards as decisive (cf. Cooper, 2018, 532, 537). Cooper 
divides his examples into non-Pauline, and Pauline texts. A particularly clear non-
Pauline example is Matthew 10:28 where Jesus tells his disciples not to fear ‘those 
who kill the body but cannot kill the soul’. A particularly clear Pauline example is 2 
Corinthians 5:8 where Paul says that ‘we would rather be away from the body and 
at home with the Lord.’ (Both NRSV translations.) Cooper claims that the doctrine 
of the intermediate state, as it is expressed in these passages, implies a form of soul-
body dualism.
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Cooper reinforces this argument in two ways. First, he argues that, contrary to the 
allegation that dualism is a Greek import to Christianity, even the Old Testament 
contains passages that imply that persons or souls continue to exist in the absence of 
the body after death. These include descriptions of the departed in Sheol, like Isaiah 
14:9–10 and the raising of the spirit of Samuel in 1 Samuel 28. Along the way, 
Cooper (2000, 53–4) also rebuts the argument, advanced by Hobbes, Robinson and 
others that the Old Testament terms translated as ‘soul’, ‘֫רּוַח’ and ‘ֶפׁש  are not used ’ֶנ֫
to refer to disembodied persons after death. Cooper contends that the term term 
 usually translated as ‘shades’, is used in this way, and that the metaphysical ,’ְרָפִאים‘
implications are the same, irrespective of which term is used. Secondly, Cooper 
appeals to evidence that intertestamental Jews generally, and the Pharisees in par-
ticular, held that prior to resurrection, the dead are ‘alive somewhere, somehow, in 
an interim state’ (Wright, 2003, 130). This, Cooper argues, makes it natural to 
understand biblical affirmations of the resurrection in the same way, especially given 
that Jesus and Paul align themselves with the Pharisees on the question of the resur-
rection at Matthew 22:23–33 and Acts 23:6–9.
Some of the passages Cooper identifies, including Matthew 10:28, seem to imply 
that humans have ‘souls’ (usually ‘ψυχαί’) that exist in the intermediate state. Oth-
ers, including 2 Corinthians 5:8, seem to entail that human persons themselves do 
so. Cooper assumes that for the Bible, as for Plato or Descartes, for a person’s soul 
to continue to exist following death just is for that person to continue to exist. But 
Cooper acknowledges that the passages that he identifies are also consistent with a 
trichotomist view on which a person and a soul are distinct things, both of which 
continue to exist after death. This possibility does not bear on the responses to 
Cooper’s argument discussed in this paper, and so I will follow Cooper in using 
‘soul’ and ‘person’ interchangeably for the thing that, on his reading of the Bible, 
continues to exist in the intermediate state.
Cooper focuses on the thesis that the Bible implies some kind of soul-body dual-
ism. He does not give close attention to whether this is dualism in the sense that 
contradicts physicalism. But this is clearly a matter of significance, given the impor-
tant place of physicalism in recent philosophy. In what follows my principal concern 
is whether the passages Cooper identifies imply dualism in the sense that contra-
dicts physicalism. In taking this approach, I do not mean to suggest that Cooper is 
committed to the thesis that the passages he identifies imply dualism in that sense. 
Rather, I view this as an issue that merits our attention in its own right. I am par-
ticularly interested in two philosophical objections to the biblical argument for 
dualism, considered as an argument against Christian physicalism, and in whether 
those objections can be surmounted. For this purpose, it is convenient to focus on 
Cooper’s central claim that New Testament passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Cor-
inthians 5:8 imply that the persons or souls continue to exist without the body after 
death. And it is convenient to treat these two passages as representative. I adopt this 
approach because the philosophical questions that I discuss can be adequately rep-
resented in abstraction from the wider details of biblical scholarship, not because I 
think the wider scholarship irrelevant or that Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
carry most or all of the weight of the biblical argument for dualism.
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The constitution objection
One way in which Christian physicalists can respond to the biblical argument for 
dualism is by arguing that the biblical texts, taken together, do not entail that per-
sons or souls continue to exist between death and resurrection as Cooper claims. 
This response has received detailed criticism, however (e.g. Cooper, 2018). It is 
not part of the purpose of this paper to evaluate that line of response. A second 
way in which Christian physicalists can respond to the biblical argument for dual-
ism is by arguing that even if the passages identified by Cooper entail that persons 
or souls continue to exist in an intermediate state, this is compatible with physi-
calism. I focus on two responses of this second variety, one well-established, the 
other new. The principal advantage of these responses is that they allow Christian 
physicalists to remain open-minded about the biblical case for an intermediate 
state. I begin with a response pioneered by Baker (1995, 2004, 2011, 2018) and, 
following her, Corcoran (1998, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2018), which I will refer to as 
the ‘constitution objection’.
The constitution objection takes as its background a theory of the relation-
ship between human persons and their bodies which Baker labels the ‘constitu-
tion view’ (Baker, 1995 490–96; 2000 passim; 2004, 331–5; 2011 47–52; 2018, 
341–4). According to the constitution view, as Baker presents it, human persons 
stand in the same kind of relationship to their physical bodies as a statue does 
to a piece of bronze, a banknote to a piece of paper, or a flag to a piece of cloth. 
That is, human persons are not identical to their bodies, and we could in principle 
exist without our bodies. But human persons are necessarily constituted by some 
body or other. Baker and Corcoran have developed sophisticated characterisations 
of the constitution relations that they take to obtain between persons and their 
bodies. But the details need not detain us here. The important point is that it is 
plausible that there is some constitution relation such that the thesis that persons 
are wholly constituted by physical bodies is sufficient for physicalism without 
requiring that human persons depend necessarily on the existence of their cur-
rent bodies. If so, the constitution view will yield a version of physicalism that is 
consistent with the claim that a human persons—or their ‘souls’, assuming that 
this comes to the same thing—will continue to exist without their bodies after 
death, so long as they do so in virtue of being constituted by a replacement body. 
As Baker (2004, 11) puts it, ‘for all that we know, persons in the intermediate 
state are constituted by intermediate-state bodies.’ The constitution view appears, 
therefore, to be straightforwardly consistent with passages like Matthew 10:28 
and 2 Corinthians 5:8, even though it is a kind of physicalism. If so, it appears 
that Christian physicalists who accept the constitution view need not worry about 
the biblical argument for dualism.
In comparison with arguments that the Bible does not imply the existence of 
an intermediate state at all, the constitution objection has met with a sympathetic 
reception among proponents of the biblical argument for dualism. For example, 
in the preface to the second edition of his book, Cooper (2000, xxvii) himself 
concedes that the constitution objection shows that some kinds of physicalism 
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are at least consistent with the passages he identifies as implying dualism. He 
describes this as ‘a significant development that may bear fruit in the monism-
dualism debate’. Cooper continues to urge that a dualist reading is preferable. But 
he does so on the basis that the constitution objection relies on a kind of physical-
ism that is ‘counter-intuitive and no less conceptually problematic than dualism is 
alleged to be’ since it is almost ‘substance dualism in disguise’.
It is worth pausing to consider the justice of Cooper’s claim that the constitu-
tion view is ‘no less conceptually problematic’ than dualism is alleged to be. On 
the one hand, there are well known problems both for constitution relations in 
general and for the thesis that persons are constituted by their bodies in particular 
(see e.g. Olsen, 2001; Inman, 2018). So if Cooper is saying that the constitution 
view faces problems comparable in severity to those faced by dualism, he may 
be right. This will depend on contentious issues about the severity of the rel-
evant problems, which I cannot get into here. On the other hand, Cooper might 
be taken to imply that, because it is almost ‘substance dualism in disguise’, the 
constitution view faces the very same problems that dualism is alleged to face, so 
that Christian physicalists can have no principled reason to favour the constitution 
view over dualism. This criticism would be unfair. For as I have explained, the 
leading philosophical argument for physicalism is the causal exclusion argument. 
And it is plausible that the constitution view, as a kind of physicalism, will ben-
efit from the support of the causal exclusion argument. (Kim (2005) has argued 
that the exclusion problem can be extended to non-reductive physicalist views. 
But proponents of the constitution view can consistently resist this claim, as most 
nonreductive physicalists do, and proponents of the constitution view are not 
obliged to adopt a nonreductive view of higher-level properties.) So it is plausi-
ble that the constitution view shares with other kinds of physicalism the princi-
pal philosophical advantage that physicalism is supposed to enjoy over dualism. 
The same is likely to be true of many of the subordinate arguments for physical-
ism, such as arguments from neural correlations. This gives Christian physicalists 
what many would regard as a powerful reason to favour the constitution view 
over dualism. It might be worth adding that the suggestion that physicalism is 
compatible with personal survival without one’s current body is by no means an 
ad hoc manoeuvre of Christian physicalists in response the biblical case for an 
intermediate state. The same proposal is, for example, common-place amongst 
nonreligious physicalists in the literature on transhumanism (see e.g. Kurzweil, 
1999; Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008).
In summary, then, the biblical argument for dualism, as Cooper presents it, 
is built on the claim that passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
imply that persons or their souls will exist without their bodies in an intermedi-
ate state between death and resurrection and that this entails a form of dualism. 
The constitution objection shows that there is a gap in this line of reasoning. The 
claim that persons or souls will exist without their current bodies does not rule 
out physicalism. Neither does it undermine the principal advantage accorded to 
physicalism in recent philosophy. So, it looks like the Cooper’s argument poses 
no direct threat to Christian physicalism.
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The linguistic objection
The constitution objection to the biblical argument for dualism is important. For it 
seems to allow physicalists to accommodate exactly that biblical evidence which 
Cooper regards as pointing most decisively in favour of dualism. In the next sec-
tion I explain why the constitution objection can nonetheless be resisted on the 
basis of pragmatic considerations. First, however, I will outline what seems to me 
a more stubborn, linguistic objection. According to this second objection, pas-
sages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 do not just happen to be consist-
ent with physicalism. Rather, they could not in principle contradict physicalism, 
given the linguistic resources of the Bible.
The linguistic objection rests on an observation about the relationship between 
concept possession and reference. In order to pick out an entity, a, that falls under 
a concept F, you do not need a term that expresses F; you just need a term that 
expresses some concept under which a falls. On the other hand, in order to refer 
to all Fs, actual or possible, or to make claims of the form ‘there are no Fs’ or ‘x 
exists without any F’, you need a term that expresses the concept F. (I assume 
that we individuate concepts by their intensions.) For example, a fifteenth-century 
Taíno person could refer to the particular admiral, Columbus, as ‘that man’, with-
out having the concept of an admiral. But a fifteenth-century Taíno person could 
not express the proposition ‘there are no admirals nearby’ or ‘admirals command 
fleets’, prior to acquiring a term for admirals. In the same way, biblical passages 
can assert that in the intermediate state, persons or souls will exist without a par-
ticular physical thing, like the body. But they cannot straightforwardly assert that 
persons or souls will exist without any physical thing without a term for physical 
things.
It follows, I suggest, that even if the constitution objection is set aside, there 
will remain a gap in the biblical argument for dualism, insofar as it is supposed 
to show that the Bible implies dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism. 
The argument must move from textual evidence that persons or their souls exist 
without their bodies in the intermediate state to the conclusion that the intermedi-
ate state is a nonphysical state. The constitution objection points out that the fact 
that persons or souls exist without their current bodies does not entail that they 
exist without any body. But suppose that the Bible said that persons or souls will 
exist without any body at all in the intermediate state. Would that show that the 
intermediate state is a nonphysical state? No. The fact that persons or their souls 
will exist without anything in the extension of the biblical term being translated 
‘body’ (typically ‘σῶμα’ in the New Testament) entails that they will exist with-
out some physical things, but it does not entail that they will exist without any 
physical thing. For biblical terms such as ‘σῶμα’ express traditional, pretheoreti-
cal concepts whose extension is ordinarily significantly narrower than that of the 
term ‘physical’ in the sense that defines physicalism. For the term ‘physical’ as it 
defines physicalism has been introduced, in its current usage, specifically in order 
to accommodate those things posited by modern physics that do not fall under 
traditional concepts of body or matter. Hence, the biblical argument will leave 
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open the possibility that the person or soul that continues to exist in the interme-
diate state is or is constituted by a nonbodily (i.e. ἀσώματος) physical thing in 
the sense of ‘body’ used in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8. 
(As I mention below, it may be that the biblical authors would have recognised an 
extended sense of ‘σῶμα’ in which any physical thing that is or constitutes a per-
son could be called their ‘σῶμα’. If so then perhaps we could use this fact to push 
back against the linguistic objection. But before doing so we would need some 
reason for thinking that it is this extended use and not a comparatively narrow use 
that features in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8.)
The same point, it seems, will apply to any biblical passage that is reputed to 
threaten Christian physicalism. For the Bible was written in Classical Hebrew, Old 
Aramaic, and Koine Greek. These languages contain terms for things that are bod-
ily or material, in a pre-theoretical or traditional sense. But they do not contain any 
term that has the same intension as ‘physical’ as it is used in present-day definitions 
of ‘physicalism’ and ‘dualism’. Without such a term, it is not obvious how the Bible 
could articulate a commitment to dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism. 
There are two possibilities, neither of which offers much hope. First, a biblical pas-
sage might express a commitment to dualism by using a term whose intension is not 
identical to but subsumes that of ‘physical’. (The intension of one term is subsumed 
by the intension of a second term if and only if, necessarily, anything in the exten-
sion of the first term is also in the extension of the second.) Something that exists 
without anything in the extension of such a term a fortiori exists in the absence of 
anything physical. The problem here is that the intension of this term would also 
have to be narrow enough that it does not include the candidate nonphysical thing 
(i.e. the soul or person). Biblical languages contain terms that trivially satisfy the 
first criterion, such as the Greek term for ‘everything’ (πᾶν), but there are no plau-
sible examples that also satisfy the second. Alternatively, it might be possible to 
construct a complex combination of Hebrew, Aramaic, and/or Greek words that has 
the same intension, or that subsumes the intension of the modern term ‘physical’. 
Whether this is in principle possible is too complicated an issue to examine here. 
(If we knew that the soul where nonphysical, something like ‘τά ἐκτός τῆς ψυχής’, 
meaning ‘everything other than the soul’ might do. But in the present context this 
is clearly question-begging.) But even if it is possible, it would be astonishing to 
find such a construction in a text that is not explicitly engaged in twentieth/twenty-
first century analytical metaphysics. It seems then, that there is a gap in the biblical 
argument for dualism that remains even when the constitution objection has been set 
aside.
A merit of the linguistic objection is that it formalises the intuitive concern that 
there is something misguided about looking to the Bible for guidance about a dis-
tinctively modern view like physicalism. Ultimately, I think that this concern might 
be mistaken, and that we might be justified in looking to ancient texts for views 
about this topic after all. But the idea that such efforts are hopelessly anachronistic 
is prima facie plausible and deserves serious consideration. Although the linguistic 
objection is distinct from the constitution objection, it is natural to combine the lin-
guistic objection with a version of the constitution view about relationship between 
human persons and their bodies. For the most plausible theory that allows human 
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persons to exist as nonbodily physical things in the intermediate state is likely to be 
one on which we are contingently constituted by our bodies prior to death. Having 
said this, it is also possible to formulate physicalist theories that can take advantage 
of the linguistic objection without adopting a version of the constitution view. For 
example, one can imagine a kind of physicalist soul-body dualism on which human 
persons (or their ‘souls’) are from the outset identical to nonbodily physical systems 
which are distinct from and can exist without their organic bodies. (I discuss in sec-
tion seven what kind of physical systems will count as ‘nonbodily’ in the requisite 
sense. This depends on how broadly we interpret terms such as ‘σῶμα’in passages 
like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8.) The linguistic objection also differs from 
the constitution objection in that, whereas the constitution objection relies on the 
specific content of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 the linguistic 
objection relies solely on the languages in which the Bible was written. Hence, the 
linguistic objection promises to free the debate about Christian physicalism from the 
details of biblical scholarship.
Attempts to locate the philosophical anthropology of the Bible within the catego-
ries of recent metaphysics frequently focus on differences between the meanings of 
biblical terms traditionally translated as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’, and the present-day mean-
ings of these terms. Comparatively little attention is given to the difference between 
the meanings of biblical terms translated ‘body’, ‘flesh’ etc. and the present-day 
philosophical meaning of ‘physical’. But if the argument of this section is successful 
then this second difference yields a powerful argument that the Bible cannot affirm 
dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism.
A pragmatic response to the constitution objection
Should Christian dualists give up on the biblical argument as an argument against 
Christian physicalism? Perhaps not. For the linguistic objection suggests a response 
that has yet to be examined. It is true that the literal meaning of biblical passages is 
unlikely to entail dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism. But as linguistics 
has long recognised, meaning is not exhausted by literal (or ‘semantic’) meaning. 
There is also pragmatic meaning. So it remains possible to argue that while a lit-
eral reading of the passages identified by Cooper does not contradict physicalism, a 
pragmatically competent reading does. In this section and the next, I sketch what I 
think is the most promising pragmatic defence of the biblical argument for dualism, 
focussing on the central pragmatic phenomenon of conversational implicature.
According to a common characterisation, conversational implicature occurs when 
a speaker means one thing by saying something else. It was named by Paul Grice 
(1989) who gives the following example:
A: I am out of petrol
B: There is a garage round the corner.
(Grice, 1989, 32)
Speaker B in this conversation has not said that, as far as she knows, the garage 
is open and has petrol to sell. And yet she clearly intends A to infer that, as far as 
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she knows, this is so, and to recognise that this is her intention. In the terminology 
introduced by Grice, B’s utterance implicates that as far as she is aware, the garage is 
open and has petrol to sell.
Grice also advances a theory of conversational implicature that has been very 
influential. Conversation is necessarily a cooperative enterprise. For this reason, 
Grice suggests, participants can be presumed to conform to a ‘cooperative princi-
ple’, according to which you must make your contribution ‘such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange 
in which you are engaged’ (Grice, 1989, 26). Grice supplements the cooperative 
principle with several ‘maxims’ which specify that you should give neither insuf-
ficient nor excessive information, and that you should make your contribution true, 
relevant, and perspicacious. According to Grice’s theory, conversational implicature 
occurs when the presumption that an utterance conforms to the cooperative principle 
and its maxims requires the hearer to infer an implicit meaning. For example, if B 
believed that the garage is closed or out of petrol, her utterance would be irrelevant 
to A, and would therefore violate the cooperative principle. So, the presumption that 
B is not violating the cooperative principle requires the hearer to infer the implica-
ture that as far as B knows, the garage is open and has petrol to sell.
More recent works dispute the precise nature of the expectations that generate 
conversational implicature. Some, like Stephen Levinson (1983, 1987, 2000) stay 
fairly close to Grice’s cooperative principle and maxims. Others like Deidre Wilson 
and Dan Sperber (1986, 2012) defend more revisionary views. (Ernst-August Gutt’s 
(1991) application of Wilson and Sperber’s ‘relevance theory’ has had an immense 
influence on Bible translation.) Christopher Potts (2015) gives an overview. None-
theless it is highly plausible that something in the region of the expectations identi-
fied by Grice and his followers generates conversational implicatures. And so, if it is 
plausible from a broadly Gricean perspective that passages like Matthew 10:28 and 
2 Corinthians 5:8 implicate dualism, then there is a reasonable chance that they will 
also do so on whatever theory of conversational implicature we ultimately favour.
In what follows, I outline two broadly Gricean defences of the biblical argument 
for dualism. The first only gets us part of the way there. It calls into question the 
constitution objection as Baker presents it, but not the linguistic objection. The sec-
ond has the potential to rebut the linguistic objection too, but it is based on prem-
isses that are likely to be more controversial. Both attempts to defend the biblical 
argument assume that the passages identified by Cooper entail that persons or souls 
continue to exist without their current bodies between death and resurrection. The 
question is whether, in doing so, they imply a form of dualism, and if so whether it 
is dualism of the kind that contradicts physicalism.
The first Gricean argument is specifically aimed at rebutting the claim that the 
passages identified by Cooper can be accommodated by the constitution objection 
as presented by Baker. The essence of Baker’s response is captured by the following 
passage:
The Constitution View does not allow that we can exist unembodied; it does 
allow that we can exist without the bodies that constitute us now… [T]here is 
no reason to think that the intermediate state must be a disembodied state. For 
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all that we know, persons in the intermediate state are constituted by interme-
diate-state bodies. So, Cooper’s arguments provide no reason to prefer Mind-
Body Dualism. (2004, 11)
But is a pragmatically informed reading of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 
Corinthians 5:8 consistent with the claim that we—or our souls—can exist without 
the bodies that constitute us now, only by obtaining another body? Supposing that 
by ‘body’ we mean ‘body’ in the sense that appears in these passages, and not in 
some distinctively modern sense, the answer is plausibly no.
To see this, imagine a travel agency in New York that advertises an opportunity 
to ‘get away from the city’. Suppose that the destination of the vacation advertised 
is in fact Berlin. We would consider this misleading. Why? Plausibly this is because 
the literal meaning of the expression ‘get away from the city’ is ambiguous. ‘The 
city’ could denote the particular city you are in, or it could denote the type city, of 
which all cities are tokens. But if the advert only meant the token city, New York, 
then it would be violating the cooperative principle. For, it would have been pos-
sible to increase the informativeness and perspicacity of the advertisement without 
cost by referring to New York City by name, or by using a demonstrative pronoun. 
The advertisement would then have promoted the opportunity to ‘get away from this 
city’ or to ‘get away from New York’. The informativeness and perspicacity of the 
advertisement have not been increased in this way. And so, on the assumption that 
the advertisement conforms to the cooperative principle, it implicates that the vaca-
tion is an opportunity to get away from any token of the type city, Berlin included.
We need some story, in any case, about why the description ‘away from the city’ 
implicates being away from any city. And whatever story we favour is likely to apply 
mutatis mutandis to 2 Corinthians 5:8 where Paul says that we would rather be away 
from the body (ἐκ τοῦ σώματος) and at home with the Lord. If so, then 2 Cor-
inthians 5:8 implicates that, not only will we exist without our current bodies in 
the intermediate state, but we will not come into possession of replacement bodies 
either, at least in the sense of ‘body’ Paul is using in this passage. This seems like a 
natural reading. After all, if Paul only meant that we will be away from our current 
bodies then he could easily have increased the informativeness and perspicacity of 
his claim by inserting a suitable adjective or demonstrative pronoun. For example, 
he might have said that we would rather be away from this body (ἐκ τοῦ σώματος 
τούτου) (cf. Cooper, 2018, 538). The same line of reasoning can be applied to Mat-
thew 10:28 and to 1 Philippians 20:24 which resembles 2 Corinthians 5:8 except 
that it employs ‘σάρξ’ (usually translated ‘flesh’) rather than ‘σῶμα’. In each case, 
the literal content of the passage is compatible with the thesis that in the intermedi-
ate state persons or souls only exist without their current bodies, but a pragmatically 
informed reading seems to suggest that in the intermediate state persons or souls 
exist without any body.
At face value then, several of the passages that Cooper identifies implicate that 
persons or souls will exist without any body in the intermediate state. Proponents 
of the constitution objection can, of course, argue that countervailing factors under-
mine the apparent implicature. But it is not clear what factors could serve this pur-
pose. For while it is easy to marshal evidence against interpretations that entail 
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an intermediate state of any sort—for example, the fact that the intermediate state 
seems to call into question the purpose of the resurrection—it is much harder to 
identify evidence against interpretations that entail a nonbodily intermediate state 
only. It is evidence of the second kind that is needed, if the constitution objection 
is to serve its purpose in parrying the biblical argument for dualism while allow-
ing for the possibility of an intermediate state. On the other hand, the wider con-
texts discussed by Cooper tend to reinforce the apparent implicature. For example, 
Cooper argues that the idea of a disembodied intermediate state was commonplace 
in intertestamental Judaism, just as the idea of a disembodied afterlife was in the 
surrounding Greek culture. It follows that the authors of texts like Matthew 10:28 
and 2 Corinthians 5:8 had good reason to expect that their audiences would hear 
these passages as affirmations of a disembodied intermediate state. If so, the thesis 
that our understanding of these passages should be restricted to their literal content 
seems still more difficult to square with the cooperative principle.
Pending some response from proponents of the constitution objection, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that if we read passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthi-
ans 5:8 as affirming the existence of an intermediate state then we should read them 
as affirming the existence of a disembodied intermediate state, in the sense of ‘body’ 
used in these passages. Baker (2011, 55) says ‘I know of no reason—Biblical or 
philosophical—to suppose that the intermediate state must be a disembodied state.’ 
The argument of this section provides one such reason. If it is successful, then the 
constitution objection does not afford Christian physicalists a satisfactory response 
to the biblical argument for dualism after all.
This first Gricean argument does important work. If it is successful, and if pas-
sages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 affirm the existence of an interme-
diate state at all, then it seems to follow that they also presuppose a kind of dualism 
in the sense that they draw a distinction between souls or persons and bodies, and 
affirm that souls or persons can exist without bodies. However, it does not follow 
that the Bible implies dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism. The appar-
ent implicature of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 is that in the 
intermediate state, persons or souls will exist without bodies in the traditional or 
pretheoretical sense of ‘body’ used in those passages. This probably includes all 
organic bodies. Perhaps it includes material objects more broadly. But it almost cer-
tainly excludes many things that fall in the extension of the term ‘physical’ as it is 
used to define physicalism. So, the argument of this section leaves open the possibil-
ity that while the intermediate state is a nonbodily state in the sense of ‘body’ used 
in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8, it is nonetheless a physical 
state. Furthermore, although the constitution objection to the biblical argument for 
dualism appears to be unsatisfactory, relying as it does on the idea that passages like 
Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 only imply that persons or souls exist without 
their current bodies after death, this does not mean that we must give up on the 
constitution view about the relationship between human persons and their bodies on 
which that objection depends. For although Baker and Corcoran do not stress this 
point, the constitution view as they present it does not say that human persons are 
necessarily constituted by bodies in a traditional or pretheoretical sense of ‘body’, 
but that they are necessarily constituted by bodies in the modern sense of the kind of 
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things described by physics (see e.g. Baker, 2011, 48; Corcoran 2018, 374). Insofar 
as this is so, proponents of the constitution view can take advantage of the linguistic 
objection.
A pragmatic response to the linguistic objection?
The argument of the foregoing section gives us an additional reason to regard the 
linguistic objection to the biblical argument for dualism is valuable. The constitu-
tion objection says that because passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
only entail that persons or souls can exist without their current bodies after death, it 
remains possible that they do so only by acquiring replacement bodies. It is plausi-
ble that the implicatures of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 do 
not permit this, even if their literal content does. The linguistic objection is more 
stubborn. It says that even if passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
implicate that persons or souls will exist without any body at all, in the sense of 
‘body’ used in these passages, it will remain open that they will nonetheless be con-
stituted by or simply identical to, some nonbodily physical thing. It is not so easy to 
argue that the implicatures of the passages identified by Cooper rule this out. For 
those passages do not use the concept of physical things, if only because no term in 
the biblical languages expresses that concept.
Should Christian physicalists be content to rest their response to the biblical argu-
ment for dualism on the linguistic objection? This depends on how much weight 
one accords different kinds of argument in favour of physicalism. Those motivated 
by theological arguments may see limited value in maintaining a form of Christian 
physicalism that concedes the possibility of a disembodied intermediate state. For 
the theological motivations for Christian physicalism are often tied to traditional or 
pretheoretical concepts of body and flesh—concepts that have great importance in 
Christianity. If the argument of the last section is successful then Christian physi-
calists whose principal concern is to maintain that human persons are essentially 
bodily might do better to resist outright the claim that the Bible implies that persons 
or souls continue to exist in an intermediate state after death, rather than attempt to 
accommodate this possibility on the basis that we might acquire replacement bod-
ies. By contrast, those motivated primarily by philosophical arguments are likely to 
see significant value in maintaining Christian physicalism, even while conceding the 
possibility of a disembodied intermediate state. For the philosophical motivations 
for physicalism tend to be tied to the modern concept of physical things, understood 
as those things described by physics. For example, so long as it is compatible with 
physicalism, it is probable that the philosophical anthropology implied by the Bible 
will be immune to the casual exclusion argument and, more broadly, to the charge 
that it is incompatible with the findings of physical science.
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It might also be possible to maintain that the intermediate state is a bodily state 
in some biblical sense of ‘body’ while conceding that it is a nonbodily state in the 
sense that appears in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8.1 (Com-
pare: Democritus draws a sharp distinction between the body (usually ‘σῶμα’) and 
the soul (‘ψυχή’) (Diels and Kranz 1951–2, 68B 31, 37, 159, 187), but holds that 
the soul is composed of atoms of fire, and is in this sense itself a body, albeit of an 
‘especially nonbodily’ (‘μάλιστα ἀσώματον’) sort (Diels and Kranz 1951–2, 67A 
28, 68A 101, 104a).) How plausible this is depends on how broad we think the use 
of ‘body’ in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 2:8 is. One piece of 
evidence that is relevant here is 1 Corinthians 15:44 where Paul says that the resur-
rection body will be a ‘σῶμα πνευματικόν’, usually translated ‘spiritual body’. This 
could be taken in two ways. On the one hand it might be taken as evidence for a 
comparatively broad use of ‘body’, which might apply to the intermediate state, even 
if the sense of ‘body’ used at Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 2:8 does not. Alter-
natively, we might reason that since 2 Corinthians 5:8 contrasts being ‘away from 
the body’ with the resurrection, here too ‘body’ must be used in a comparatively 
broad sense that would include the ‘σῶμα πνευματικόν’ of the resurrection. In that 
case, the intermediate state will have to be a nonbodily state even in this broad sense 
of ‘body’, and the prospects for finding a biblical use of ‘body’ broader than that of 
2 Corinthians 5:8 will be that much slimmer. Even if we cannot find biblical evi-
dence for a broader sense of ‘body’ than that of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 
Corinthians 5:8, we might reason that there is an intuitive use of the English natural-
language concept ‘body’ that applies to any physical thing that is or constitutes a 
person, and that the biblical authors might have recognised such a use of ‘σῶμα’. 
(To my mind it is plausible that any fundamentally nonmental thing that is or con-
stitutes a person could be thought of as their ‘σῶμα’ in an extended or analogical 
sense.) This issue deserves to be considered further elsewhere. For now, suffice it to 
say that those who rely on the linguistic objection to the biblical argument for dual-
ism must concede that the intermediate state is a disembodied state in one biblical 
sense of ‘body’, but not necessarily that it is a disembodied state in every biblical 
sense of ‘body’. Christian physicalists may take some comfort in this.
At least some Christian physicalists, then, will have good reason to press the lin-
guistic objection to the biblical argument for dualism, even if it has been conceded 
that a pragmatically informed reading of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Cor-
inthians 5:8 suggests that there is a disembodied intermediate state, in an impor-
tant sense of ‘disembodied’. Christian physicalists who adopt this position will say 
that human persons or souls are necessarily physical but that they can continue to 
exist after death as physical things that are not bodies in the sense of ‘body’ used in 
passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 is. What would such an exist-
ence look like? This depends on what conditions we think are necessary for the con-
tinued existence of persons or souls, and (again) on how broad we take the use of 
‘body’ in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 to be. We may take 
1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the International Journal of Philosophy of Religion for the 
points raised in this paragraph.
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inspiration from the literature on transhumanism. A common transhumanist strat-
egy for explaining how we might survive in the absence of bodies, in the sense of 
human organisms, appeals to two widely accepted theories about human nature: 
computationalism about psychological states and the psychological continuity the-
ory about personal identity (see e.g. Kurzweil, 1999, 383; Weir, 2018). According 
to these theories, a person continues to exist so long as their psychological states 
continue (in accordance with a suitably demanding continuity relation) and a per-
son’s psychological states continue so long as the underlying computational pro-
cesses are maintained. On this basis transhumanists have argued that human per-
sons could survive death as computations implemented on ‘utility fog’, a substance 
composed of nanorobots. Suppose that the term translated as ‘body’ in passages like 
Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 has a comparatively narrow meaning, so that 
only applies to e.g. organic bodies or more or less solid, unitary objects. (We might 
think here of the sense of ‘σῶμα’ used by Democritus when he contrasts the soul 
with the body, even though he regard the soul as itself a body in a broader sense of 
the term.) In that case existence as a computation implemented on ‘utility fog’ is 
likely to count as disembodied physical existence in the requisite sense. So too, for 
that matter, is survival as the cloud of fiery atoms with which the ancient atomists 
identified the soul.
It may be that ‘body’ in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 has 
a broader extension than one that includes only organic bodies and more or less 
unitary objects. As we have just seen, the context of 2 Corinthians 5:8 might be 
taken to indicate that ‘σῶμα’ here has a broad sense that will include Paul’s ‘σῶμα 
πνευματικόν’. In that it case it seems likely that ‘bodies’ will also include the utility 
fog of the transhumanists and the nebulous soul of the atomists. (In a phrase similar 
to 1 Corinthians 15:44, Epicurus (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.63) calls the soul 
on this view a body ‘most resembling breath’ (‘προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι’).) 
But it is plausible that modern physics supplies entities that will not count as bodies 
even in this comparatively broad sense of ‘body’. For our most complete theories of 
elementary ‘particles’ represent them not as small solid billiard ball-like objects, but 
as (very oddly behaved) excitations in the fundamental physical fields. The intui-
tively body-like entities of classical physics, even those that resemble breath or fire, 
only emerge when you have large numbers of these excitations occurring together in 
the right combinations. If computationalism and the psychological continuity theory 
are true then there is no reason why God should not implement the computational 
processes that are sufficient for your continued existence as, for example, a pattern 
of excitations in the electron field. Indeed, doing so might be more efficient than 
implementing them in a classical system, given the advantages of quantum comput-
ing. In this scenario, you will exist without anything that Democritus, Epicurus or 
Hobbes would have recognised as a ‘body’, and it is plausible that the same will go 
for the sense of ‘body’ that features in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthi-
ans 5:8, even on a broad interpretation of its meaning.
It is plausible, then, that even when it is reinforced by pragmatic considerations, 
the biblical argument for dualism will at most show that passages like Matthew 
10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 imply that persons or souls will exist without bodies in 
the intermediate state, in a traditional or pretheoretical sense of ‘body’, not that they 
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will do so without anything physical. If so, then Christian dualists must rely on other 
arguments to make the case for dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism. 
There exist two ways proponents of the biblical argument for dualism might push 
back at this stage. First, as I mentioned in section three, they might argue that in 
fact, the sense of ‘body’ used in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
is so broad that it will apply to any physical realization of a person or soul—even to 
a pattern of excitations in the electron field. Secondly, they might argue that those 
physical theories that permit personal survival without bodies in the sense of ‘body’ 
used in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 are physically or meta-
physically implausible. Both responses deserve consideration, but I will not discuss 
them here. Instead, I will conclude by considering what seems to me a more promis-
ing argument for the thesis that passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
imply dualism in the sense that rules out physicalism. Although I think this argu-
ment promising, I also have some doubts about it in view of which I think it is likely 
to have limited dialectical force, at least pending further investigation. The argument 
I have in mind is based on the thought that, although there are physicalist views that 
permit persons or souls to exist without bodies after death, these views are compara-
tively unnatural, whereas dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism, though it 
may be false, is very natural. It follows that when someone affirms that persons or 
souls will exist without bodies after death, it is probable that they are presupposing 
dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism. And if they do nothing to forestall 
this assumption, there will be a case for thinking that they thereby implicate dualism 
of the kind in question. Hence there will be a case for thinking that if passages like 
Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 implicate that the intermediate state is a dis-
embodied state then they also implicate that it is a nonphysical state.
This argument rests, not only on the Gricean notion of implicature, but also on 
the claim that there is something peculiarly natural about dualism of the sort that 
rules out physicalism. This claim can be supported by the widely affirmed thesis 
that humans are naturally drawn to a ‘common-sense’ or ‘folk’ dualist picture of 
human nature that resembles traditional substance dualism. K. Mitch Hodge (2008, 
388) lists multiple researchers in philosophy, psychology, anthropology and biology 
who affirm something in the vicinity of this claim. The most vocal among them is 
the psychologist Paul Bloom (2004, 2007). Bloom asserts that from early infancy 
humans instinctively draw a sharp distinction between material bodies, including 
the human body, and immaterial minds or souls. He describes the resulting picture 
of human nature as ‘a strong substance dualism of the sort defended by philoso-
phers like Plato and Descartes’ (Bloom, 2007, 149). Proponents of the thesis that 
humans are naturally drawn to a common-sense form of dualism tend to take it for 
granted that the sort of dualism in question is incompatible with physicalism. How-
ever, this requires explanation. For young infants and historical philosophers like 
Plato and Descartes are no more acquainted with modern physics than the authors 
of the Bible. And so if the dualist position that they favour is incompatible with 
physicalism, this cannot be because they believe that minds or souls are not among 
the things described by modern physics. If it is incompatible with physicalism this is 
presumably because, although common-sense dualism does not involve the idea that 
minds or souls are left out by physics, it does involve the idea that minds or souls 
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have some characteristic F where, as a matter of fact, nothing described by physics 
is F. (That is, common-sense dualism will include a content such as < minds or souls 
are F > where in fact nothing described by physics is F. The content of common-
sense dualism will not itself concern modern physics.) For example, common-sense 
dualism is associated with the idea that minds or souls are publicly unobservable. 
It is plausible that everything described by physics is publicly observable, either 
directly or via instruments. If so, then it follows that the minds or souls of common-
sense dualism are not physical in the sense that defines physicalism.
There are multiple plausible candidates for F, and so it seems probable that one or 
more will do the job. In view of recent discussions of the definition of physicalism, 
a particularly salient candidate for F is the property of being fundamentally mental. 
Minds or souls are fundamentally mental if and only if they do not exist in virtue of 
more basic nonmental things. For example, Cartesian souls cannot be analysed or 
disaggregated into more basic nonmental parts or properties, roughly because Carte-
sian souls have no proper parts and all of their properties are ‘modes’ of the ‘princi-
pal attribute’ thought. In this respect, Cartesian souls differ markedly from physical 
things as we usually conceive of them, whether they are human bodies, clouds of 
nanorobots, or patterns in the fundamental physical fields. Bloom claims that the 
common-sense dualist picture which humans naturally favour closely resembles that 
of Descartes. If so, then presumably common-sense dualism also represents minds 
or souls as fundamentally mental. It is, moreover, independently plausible that, inso-
far as there exist psychological factors that make us natural dualists, they do so in 
part because they make it natural to think of our mental lives as fundamentally men-
tal. If common-sense dualism represents minds or souls as fundamentally mental 
then this gives us a particularly straightforward reason for thinking that common-
sense dualism is incompatible with physicalism. For, not only is it widely believed 
that no physical thing is in fact fundamentally mental, but also, most philosophers 
are happy to stipulate that this must be so if physicalism obtains. (Again, see Wil-
son (2006, fn. 1) for examples.) This stipulation is useful in responding to Hempel’s 
dilemma and in explaining why physicalism is incompatible with Russellian forms 
of panpsychism.
There is, then, a case for thinking that humans are naturally drawn to a common-
sense dualist picture of human nature that rules out physicalism. Suppose, which 
seems likely, that there is no comparably natural view that allows persons or souls 
to exist without bodies in a traditional or pretheoretical sense of ‘body’ and that is 
compatible with physicalism. It follows that when someone affirms that persons or 
souls will exist without bodies after death that it is, all things being equal, prob-
able that they are presupposing dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism. The 
final step in our argument says that, for this reason, if such a speaker does noth-
ing to indicate otherwise, dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism is part of 
the implicature of their utterance. This is plausible because the speaker in such a 
scenario is in a position to expect their audience to assume that they are presuppos-
ing the common-sense dualist picture of human nature to which we are all drawn. 
And so, supposing that they are conforming to the cooperative principle, they should 
indicate if this is not so. (It is necessary to assume here that implicatures need only 
follow abductively, and not deductively, from the utterance and the assumption that 
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the speaker conforms to the cooperative principle, but this assumption is widely 
accepted (cf. Rysiew, 2000, 577).) The implicature will be stronger the more famil-
iar the speaker and audience are with the common-sense dualist picture it involves. 
For this reason, the line of argument proposed here might be reinforced by contex-
tual factors. For example, if it is true that humans are naturally drawn to a common-
sense dualist view that rules out physicalism, then it seems likely that the authors 
and original audience of the Bible would have been familiar with manifestations of 
this view in Platonic, Pharisaic, and folk conceptions of the soul-body relation. If so, 
this will increase the probability that the original audience of the Bible would have 
understood passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 as endorsements of 
the common-sense dualist view in question. This, in turn, will increase the severity 
of the breach in the cooperative principle if the authors are not endorsing such a 
position. The strength of the implicature will also be greater the greater the degree 
naturalness that we assign to common-sense dualism in comparison with physical-
ist views that permit persons or souls to exist without bodies in the sense of ‘body’ 
used in passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8.
There is, therefore, a pragmatic case for thinking that if passages like Matthew 
10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 implicate that the intermediate state is a disembodied 
state, then they also implicate that it is a nonphysical state. As I have indicated, I 
think this argument should be taken seriously. The literature on common-sense dual-
ism has not yet, to my knowledge, investigated the role of the psychological factors 
underlying common-sense dualism in generating conversational implicatures. This 
is likely to be a fruitful line of enquiry which might shed light on, and to some 
extent justify, the impulse to read passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 
5:8 as endorsements of dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism. For two rea-
sons, however, I doubt that the argument sketched here can yield a dialectically pow-
erful case for thinking that the Bible implicates dualism in the sense that contradicts 
physicalism without further reinforcement. These reasons concern, respectively, the 
claim that humans are naturally drawn to a form of common-sense dualism of the 
sort that contradicts physicalism and the claim that if so then passages like Matthew 
10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 implicate dualism of the kind in question.
The argument I have outlined rests on the assumption that humans are naturally 
drawn to a form of common-sense dualism that resembles traditional substance 
dualism. If the argument is to succeed, it is crucial that that the common-sense dual-
ist picture in question should represent minds or souls as having some character-
istic F, such as that of being fundamentally mental, where no physical thing is F. 
Although this assumption is plausible, it is far from certain. Hodge (2008, 2018, 
2021) has identified a number of cultural, philosophical and theoretical problems 
for Bloom’s claim that humans are natural Cartesians, and has developed an alterna-
tive account of the data reputed to support this hypothesis. Edward Slingerland and 
Maciej Chudek (2011, 998) report that a quantitative study of mind and body con-
cepts in ancient China supports Hodge’s position over Bloom’s. A particularly clear 
problem for the claim that the cognitive default resembles Descartes’s dualism is the 
fact that many putative expressions of folk dualism represent disembodied souls as 
perceptible entities, whose disembodiment is evinced by their transparency, diffuse-
ness, or peculiar behaviours such as appearing and vanishing at will. This way of 
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representing disembodiment is as old as the Odyssey and the Epic of Gilgamesh, and 
turns up in biblical passages such as Matthew 14:26 and Luke 24:37 when the disci-
ples suppose Jesus to be a ‘φάντασμά’ or ‘πνεῦμα’, both typically translated ‘ghost’. 
This way of representing disembodiment coheres poorly with Descartes’ dualism, 
and does not obviously imply that souls are nonphysical entities, either because they 
are fundamentally mental or for some other reason. It is true that other evidence, 
such as the tendency of infants to assume that our psychological lives continue after 
death, is more favourable to the view that the common-sense dualist position resem-
bles that of Descartes (cf. Bering, 2006). But pending further research any argu-
ment that rests on the assumption that this is so will be open to serious challenges. 
Michael Antony (2006) proposes some lines of enquiry which would be particularly 
helpful in determining in what respects the cognitive default resembles Descartes’ 
dualism. The recently inaugurated research programme on the ‘meta-problem of 
consciousness’ is also highly relevant (cf. Chalmers, 2018; Kammerer 2020). This 
is the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem about the idea that 
consciousness is physical in the first place. It is relevant because a popular hypoth-
esis is that there exist deep-seated and widespread features of human psychology 
that drive us to think of our mental lives in a way that rules out physicalism. If so 
then explanatory parsimony suggests that these same factors play an important role 
in accounting for common-sense dualism and that we should, therefore, expect com-
mon-sense dualism to be dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism.
The argument of this section also depends on the thesis that if humans are 
naturally drawn to a form of common-sense dualism that contradicts physical-
ism, then passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 implicate dualism 
of this kind. I have suggested that this is plausible on the basis that these passages 
do seem to implicate that persons or souls exist without bodies in the intermedi-
ate state. For this reason, if it is true that humans are naturally drawn to a form 
of common-sense dualism that contradicts physicalism then there seems to be a 
cogent abductive argument from the content of passages like Matthew 10:28 and 
2 Corinthians 5:8, and the assumption that the authors are adhering to Grice’s 
cooperative principle, to the conclusion that the authors are presupposing com-
mon-sense dualism of the sort in question. I have also suggested that the impli-
cature might be reinforced by contextual factors. However, even granting these 
claims, the presence of the implicature can be challenged. One reason for this is 
that implicatures depend on the relevance of their content in the context in which 
they occur. In Grice’s terms, they depend on the ‘accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk exchange’. There is therefore room for Christian physicalists to argue 
that because the New Testament is not a manual of metaphysics its audience have 
no reason to suppose that passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 
will communicate an accurate account of the ontology of human persons. (Mur-
phy (2006, 21) suggests, in the vein, that the Bible’s ambiguity on questions of 
philosophical anthropology indicates that it does not affirm any doctrine on this 
issue.) For this reason, even if it is true that passages like Matthew 10:28 and 2 
Corinthians 5:8 would implicate dualism of the sort that rules out physicalism if 
they occurred in contexts where philosophical anthropology is at issue, it is not 
obvious that they do so in their actual context.
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Neither of these two lines of objection strikes me as decisive. On balance, my 
judgement is that the data on common-sense dualism probably is best explained 
by the thesis that we have a natural tendency to think in terms of something like 
Descartes’s substance dualism, and that the passages identified by Cooper may well 
implicate dualism of the kind in question. But I would be hesitant to place signifi-
cant weight on the argument outlined in this section without further evidence that 
humans are strongly drawn to a form of common-sense of the sort that rules out 
physicalism and that readers of the Bible can reasonably expect passages like Mat-
thew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 to communicate what the authors take to be an 
accurate understanding of the ontology of human persons. Evidence of the first kind 
may be sought in future research on common-sense dualism and related issues such 
as the meta-problem of consciousness. These research programmes are relatively 
young and it is possible that the requisite evidence will be forthcoming. Evidence of 
the second kind is likely be affected by all sorts of abstruse hermeneutical issues and 
for this reason, I am less confident about the prospects for progress in this regard.
In view of the concerns raised, it seems likely that the linguistic objection will 
render the biblical argument for dualism of limited dialectical force as an argument 
against Christian physicalism, even when it has been accepted that passages like 
Matthew 10:28 and 2 Corinthians 5:8 implicate a disembodied intermediate state. If 
so, Christian physicalists who are open to the possibility of an intermediate state can 
rely on the linguistic objection to the biblical argument for dualism, so long as they 
are willing to concede that the intermediate state is not a bodily state, in the sense 
of ‘body’ expressed by biblical terms like ‘σῶμα’ and ‘σάρξ’ as they are used in the 
relevant passages. Those Christian physicalists who find this unacceptable should 
either seek a response to the Gricean argument of the previous section or resist the 
idea that the Bible implies the existence of an intermediate state of any kind. Chris-
tian dualists might benefit from examining how to improve the Gricean response to 
the linguistic objection outlined in this section, taking into account new research 
on common-sense dualism and the meta-problem of consciousness. Christian dual-
ists who see the linguistic objection as successful should rely on other arguments to 
establish dualism in the sense that contradicts physicalism.
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